Validity of Restrictions on Employee Activities in
Opposition to an Incumbent Union
Under the National Labor Relations Act,' a union designated or
selected by the majority of employees in a bargaining unit serves as
the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in the unit
regardless of the union affiliation of any single employee. 2 Generally,
the bargaining representative retains this exclusive status until a majority of unit employees vote to decertify or replace3 the representative
in an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). Leaders of incumbent unions have employed various means
to discourage employee activities in support of decertification or re4
placement.
One frequently used tactic is for the union to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement that authorizes the employer to discharge or suspend unit employees who solicit union membership or distribute literature on company premises. 5 The NLRB has held the adoption and enforcement of such provisions to be unfair labor practices on the part of
1 Ch. 372, §§ I et seq., 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA].
2 NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). This designation or selection may be through
a Board certification election conducted according to the procedures of § 9, or by employer recognition based on authorization cards or other independent evidence of majority
status. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969).
3 The term "decertify" is generally used to refer to the removal of exclusive authority
from the incumbent union in favor of either another bargaining representative or individual negotiations. For the sake of clarity, this comment frequently uses the term "replace"
to refer to the former situation.
4 The National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the
Board, will conduct an election only in response to a petition filed by an employee or an
employer that shows "reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation . . .
exists .... " NLRA § 9(c)(1). 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). Ordinarily the petitioner must
provide evidence that 30 percent of the employees in the unit have authorized the election
or representation by the replacing union. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29
C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1973). As a result, a significant amount of antiunion campaigning
generally occurs prior to the official scheduling of an election.
5 Such sanctions, although they may be imposed against proponents of both the incumbent and its rivals, in practice favor the incumbent because of the requirement of a petition showing support for an election. See note 4 supra. In addition, the incumbent usually
has various advantages in reaching employees with its message, for example bulletin
boards provided by the employer for incumbent union use, partisan union papers, union
meetings, and notoriety resulting from its position of authority. See NLRB v. Mid-States
Metal Prods. Co., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1968).
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both the union and the employer. The circuits have split over the
validity of these provisions. 6
Other methods employed by unions to discourage activities in opposition to an incumbent include the fining and suspension or expulsion of members who support a rival union or engage in other
"conduct unbecoming a union member," such as attempting to decertify
the incumbent. Although the use of fines in this situation has been disapproved, 7 neither the NLRB nor the courts have found the use of
8
either suspension or expulsion to be an unfair labor practice.
This comment will examine the present rules governing control of
union member activities in this area, through collective bargaining
agreements and through internal union discipline. It will be suggested
that a no-solicitation provision in a collective bargaining agreement
must be held to constitute an unfair labor practice, that union-imposed
fines have been properly rejected and expulsion improperly allowed
as means of intra-union discipline for such activities, and that suspension for the period immediately preceding an election is a permissible reaction to antiunion activities.
I.

WAIVERS OF SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION RIGHTs
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

A.

The Response of the Legal System

It has generally been held to be an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) 9 and 8(a)(3)10 of the NLRA for an employer unilaterally
to promulgate or apply a rule disciplining employees for union solicitation during nonworking time or distribution of literature in nonworking areas of the plant."1 Although this rule was originally devel6 See text and notes at notes 14-30 infra.
7 See text and notes at notes 61-75 infra.
8 See text and notes at notes 76-91 infra.
9 Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), provides that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section 7." Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides in part: "Employees
shall have the right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities .... "
10 Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization... "
11 This general rule is based on a balancing of employee interests in engaging in
concerted activities and employer interests in guaranteeing necessary production and discipline through control over work time and the work place. See Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[41:190

oped to prevent employers from impeding attempts to organize a
previously unorganized plant, 12 it undoubtedly also forbids unilaterally
imposed rules aimed at preventing replacement or decertification of
an existing representative. 3 There is a conflict, however, between the
Board and several of the circuit courts over whether unions are able
to "waive" these restrictions on employer authority.
During the early part of the 1960's, the NLRB disapproved nosolicitation provisions except as applied to activities on behalf of incumbent unions. This policy was set forth in Gale Products,4 where
the Board spoke of the importance of workplace communication to
employee exercise of the right to choose bargaining representatives, 5
Under certain special circumstances, the relative weights of the interests of the parties
may be altered. For example, no-solicitation or no-distribution rules are allowed when
employee solicitation or distribution would take place in nonworking areas that are
nonetheless frequented by customers of the employer, notably sales areas of department
stores. See, e.g., Famous-Barr Co., 59 N.L.R.B, 976, 15 L.R.R.M. 173 (1944), modified and
enforced sub nom., NLRB v. May Dep't Stores, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 725 (1946). Similarly an employer's interest in keeping outsiders off his premises
has been found sufficient to permit him to enforce a rule broadly prohibiting solicitation
and distribution on his premises by nonemployees, as long as alternative channels of
communication are available. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
On the subject of employer no-solicitation rules generally, see Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the NLRB, 40 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 417 (1971); Vanderheyden,
Employee Solicitationand DistributionRights: A Second Look, 14 LAB. L.J. 781 (1963).
12 Similarly, an employer may not dominate a representative, NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(2) (1970), nor favor one of two rivals. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1970);
NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Majestic Molded Prods., Inc. v. NLRB,
330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Vale & Towne Mfg. Co., 114 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1940).
13 Cf. General Aniline & Film Corp., 145 NL.R.B. 1215, 55 L.R.RM. 1126 (1964); Gale
Products Div., Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249, 53 LR.R.M, 1242, 1243
(1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964); Fraitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
884,26 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1950).
14 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963). The deposed president of the certified
representative had circulated membership cards for an independent union. He was warned
by his employer that he was in violation of collective bargaining contract provisions
broadly prohibiting distribution and solicitation and would be discharged if he continued
his activities. The Board found that promulgation of the provisions and the threat of
discharge constituted unfair labor practices under section 8(a)(1) and struck down the rule
except as applied to activities on behalf of the incumbent union. The Seventh Circuit
denied enforcement, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964). See discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in text and notes at notes 24-25 infra. The Board followed its Gale Products
principle in a number of other cases, See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 74
L.R.R.M. 1599 (June 10, 1970); 1AM (McDonnell Douglas Corp.), 171 N.L.R.B. 234, 68
L.R.R.M. 1051 (1968), modified and enforced, 415 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1969); Mid States
Metal Prods. Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 872, 61 L.R.RM. 1159 (1966), enforced, 403 F.2d 702 (5th
Cir. 1968); General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 56 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1964), enforcement
denied, 345 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1965).
15 142 NXL.R.B. at 1249, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1243. See also May Dep't Stores, 136 N,L.R.B.
797, 802, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862, 1864 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
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and distinguished restrictions on solicitation for incumbent unions
from similar restraints on solicitation for competing unions, approv16
ing only the former. In NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products Co., the
Fifth Circuit upheld a similar Board finding of a violation of section
8(a)(1) based on the discharge of an employee for circulating a decertification petition in violation of a contractual no-solicitation provision.
In enforcing the Board's order, the court stated broadly that, although
the right to engage in some forms of concerted activities can be waived
by the bargaining representative, economic rights are distinguishable
from the individual rights essential to proper selection and reevalua7
tion of the collective bargaining representative.' This distinction
rested in part on the disparity of interest between unions and employ8
ees relative to employees' ability to oust their bargainingrepresentative.'
The Board has recently adopted a modification of its Gale Products
decision, following the Eighth Circuit's decision in 1AM v. NLRB
(McDonnellDouglas).'9 In that case, the Board had invalidated a no-dis20
tribution provision as to all parties except the incumbent union; the
circuit court, relying on Mid-States Metal Products,enforced the Board
order, but only after modifying it to prohibit application of the pro21
vision to all union distributions, whether for or against the incumbent.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have accepted neither the Board's
former position of partial invalidation nor the Board's and Eighth Circuit's current position of total invalidation. Instead, they have relied on
dicta from early Board decisions 22 to support the principle that unions
:1 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968), enforcing 156 N.L.R.B. 872, 61 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1966),
noted in 20 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 796 (1969); 22 VAND. L. REV. 664 (1969); 14 ViLL. L.

REv.

552 (1969).
17 403 F.2d at 705.
18 Id.

19 415 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1969), modifying and enforcing 171 N.L.R.B. 234, 68 L.R.R.M.
1051 (1968).
20 415 F.2d at 116. The court reserved, however, the question of the validity of restricdons applicable only to periods when election or contract bars preclude filing a petition
with the Board. Id. at 115-16. Although the employees' interest in campaigning during
these periods is less than during other periods, it is still substantial. A campaign against
an entrenched union necessitates activities well in advance of the filing of a petition.
21 The Board followed this approach in Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 79 L.R.R.M.
1283 (1972). The trial examiner had applied the Board's Gale Products rule in finding
that a broad no-distribution rule in which the union acquiesced was invalid when applied
to distribution on behalf of any union other than the incumbent. Relying on McDonnell
Douglas, the Board modified the order, declaring that the rule could not be applied to
restrict activities on behalf of any union, including the incumbent. The Sixth Circuit
denied enforcement, Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (1973), cert. granted, 42 L.W.
3174 (Oct. 9, 1973) relying on its decision in Armco, discussed in text at notes 26-30 infra.
22Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 884, 885, 26 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1281-82 (1950);
Famops Barr Co., 59 N.LR.B. 976, 981, 982 n.17, 15 L.L.RM. 173, 174 (1944), modified
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are able to "waive" employee solicitation rights. 23 For example, in

NLRB v. Gale Products Division of Outboard Marine Corp.,24 the
Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's finding of an 8(a)(1)
violation, stressing that the no-distribution provision did not "strip
the employees of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Act" but only
precluded "a convenient-albeit a most effective-way of their exercise.., in favor of the available alternatives .... 25
In Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB,6 the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of a similar Board finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation.2 7 Freedom of contract, the court explained, is "one of the most important
rights enjoyed by labor unions and employers.128 The court compared
the solicitation and distribution "waiver" to permissible waivers of
other employee statutory rights, notably the right to strike. It expressed
concern over the discriminatory effect of the Board's order (allowing
enforcement of the provision only against the incumbent) and the
Board's failure to consider the existence of alternative means of communication. Underlying the decision was the court's view that "[p]resumably the union obtained from Armco a quid pro quo for its assent
to the clause." 29 The court concluded that "[t]he Board has no power
to interfere with the exercise of that right or to sit in judgment on the
wisdom of substantive contractual provisions." 30
B.

The Bargaining Process and Contractually Imposed
No-Solicitation Rules

The proscription of unilaterally imposed no-solicitation rules has
been considered warranted because the rules sacrificed crucial employee
and enforced sub nom., NLRB v. May Dep't Stores, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 725 (1946).

23 The District of Columbia Circuit Court has indirectly taken the same approach.
See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964), noted in 44 NEB. L. REv. 645 (1965). The Board's decision
in Gale Productsis discussed in text and notes at notes 14-15 supra.
25 337 F.2d at 392.
20 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
27 The Sixth Circuit has adhered to this position. See Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d
1269 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 L.W. 3174 (Oct. 9, 1973), denying enforcement of 195
N.L.R.B. 265, 79 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1972); General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (6th
Cir. 1965), denying enforcement of 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 56 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1964). The District
of Columbia Circuit has held that the NLRB could rely on the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Armco when the relevant events occurred in that circuit and an identical provision was involved, see United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1966), but the Board has
recently refused to follow Armco in such a situation. Armco Steel Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No.
26, 74 L.R.R.M. 1599 (June 10, 1970).
28 344 F.2d at 624.
29 Id. at 625.
80 Id. at 624.
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31
interests to preserve relatively insignificant employer interests. Negotiated contract terms, however, might alter this balance enough to
justify no-solicitation rules. Allowing waivers might benefit employees,
at least to the extent that their representatives trade solicitation rights
for employer concessions that are more valuable to the employees. If
this view is adopted, the union might be seen as having discretion both
to waive solicitation rights and to determine what concessions are
sufficient to justify the waivers.
The determinative question is the scope of the bargaining representative's authority. If the representative, by making particular concessions or demands, acts in excess of his authority or in violation of his
duty to represent unit employees fairly and equally, section 8(b)(1)(A)
is violated.3 2 The employer is not required to bargain on such demands
3
nor entitled to take benefit from such concessions, and if the employer does acquiesce, he should be found to be in violation of 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) to the extent he would have been if he had acted unilaterally. 34
In allowing contractual waivers of solicitation rights, the Sixth and
35
Seventh Circuits have stressed the generally recognized policy of encouraging private resolution of disputes between the employer and the
union. Although the union's authority is limited to representation of
employee interests, this policy allows union officers wide latitude in
balancing employee interests against employer concessions in the give
31 See note 11 supra.
32 A union that does not fulfill its duty of fair representation violates sections 8(b)(1)(A)
and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); cf. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944).
33 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1944); Richardson v. Texas &
N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235,
237 (2d Cir. 1953). If the bargaining representative is empowered to request restrictions on
unit employee solicitation rights, the employer not only may be permitted to accept the
request, he also may be required to consider it because of his statutory duty to bargain
with the representative relative to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1970).
34 NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1953); cf. Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1953). The cases dealing with contractually imposed no-solicitation rules have not treated
as relevant whether the restraint of section 7 rights was charged against the employer
under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) or against the union under section 8(b)(1)(A). See text and
notes at notes 22-30 supra.
35 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957); LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
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and take of negotiations." Bargaining for no-solicitation provisions
that benefit most unit employees therefore might be within the scope
37
of this authority.
Although a policy favoring private resolution of bargaining disputes
can properly be followed with respect to waivers of certain rights to
engage in concerted activity, such as the right to strike,38 it seems inappropriate to apply the policy to union waivers of employee solicitation rights. Permitting the bargaining representative to waive employees' right to strike by negotiating a no-strike clause is logical given
the nature of that right. First, the waiver of the right to strike seriously
limits the power of the union as well as that of the employees, and the
union has no incentive to abandon that right without receiving a substantial concession. Second, the NLRA's goal of promoting economic
stability 9 is directly and substantially furthered by recognition of the
parties' right to agree to limitations on rights to strike and lock out
and to nondisruptive means of dispute settlement. 40
No-solicitation clauses do not have either of these positive attributes
of no-strike clauses. First, in negotiations on a no-solicitation clause it
is possible for the union to waive major employee rights without
seriously prejudicing its own position; indeed, a no-solicitation clause,
while weakening the rights of the individual employees, strengthens
the position of the union. Second, the degree to which economic
stability is promoted by restrictions on employees' freedom to solicit
for decertification or replacement is much less significant than the
stability provided by restrictions on their freedom to strike at any time.
36 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S, 330, 338 (1952).

37 Under this approach, the Board would defer to the bargaining representative's judg-

ment in determining whether there had been a significant benefit to employees from the
waiver and would avoid anf nullification or redrafting of the contract that would alter
the balance of benefits arrived at by the parties in their original agreement.
38 The right to strike may be waived. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
39 See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
40 In assessing the scope of restrictions on the right to strike, courts frequently consider
whether the collective agreement provides for resort to arbitration for the dispute involved.
See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 106 (1962), This treatment
is justified on the ground that industrial peace is promoted by the existence of such

clauses and arbitration rights are a reasonable exchange for the loss of more coercive

means of dispute settlement. See generally United Steelworkers v. Warrior &Gulf Nay. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957). But
cf. Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 261n,7 (1962).
The probability of a reasonable exchange and the amount of furtherance of industrial
stability are both much smaller in the case of solicitation waivers.
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Union Authority to Negotiate a Contractual Waiver
of Solicitation Rights
Because a majority of employees must authorize the bargaining representative to represent all the employees in the unit, it has frequently
41
been suggested that the representative is an agent of the employees.
Under agency principles, the representative might be authorized to
waive employees' solicitation rights in exchange for benefits under a
collective bargaining agreement. 42 Agency, however, is an inadequate
description of the relationship between the representative and many of
the employees in the unit. Many employees may never have voted for the
union in a representation election, executed an authorization card,
joined the union, or otherwise shown initial consent to the representative's agency. Contrary to common law rules of agency, 43 employees,
whether consenting or nonconsenting, are not completely free to terminate the union's representation. 44 Thus, although some employees
must have consented to the representation, agency law does not provide an adequate justification or explanation of the representative's
power.
Alternatively, the ability of a labor organization to negotiate with
an employer may be viewed as a function of its economic strength. A
strong employee organization will wish to define the terms of employment of nonconsenting employees as a means of establishing uniformity
in working conditions and reducing divisive competition in its memC.

41 See, e.g., Marvel Schebler Div., Borg Warner Corp., 56 N.L.R.B. 105, 108, 14 L.R.R.M.
111, 112 (1944); Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 85, 259 N.W. 798, 799
(1935); Comment, Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government: A "State Action"
Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 4, 9 ff. (1968).
42 An agent generally has authority to contract on behalf of his principal. REsATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 144 (1957). Thus, he can give up rights of the principal in exchange
for contractual consideration. See, for example, the following cases dealing with the right
of a bargaining representative to modify seniority rights: Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 380 (1953); Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1962);
Wagner Mfg., Inc. v. Culbertson, 206 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. App. 1965). Some cases, however,
suggest limitations on the agent's right to modify a contract. See, e.g., Ferro Concrete
Constr. Co. v. United States, 112 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1940); State Finance Co. v. Hershel
Calif. Fruit Prods. Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 524, 527-28, 47 P.2d 821, 823 (1935). But see Upshur
County v. Heydrick, 221 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
43 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1957).
44 American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 252, 82 L.R.R.M. 1439, 1440-41 (1953).
Acceptance or retention of employment should not be regarded as original or continuing
consent to the agent's authority. The employee's mobility is severely curtailed by the
information, transportation, training, and psychological costs associated with changing jobs.
The Wagner Act's encouragement and protection of union activities reflects awareness of
these costs. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). It would, therefore, be inconsistent with
the public policy embodied in that Act to find contractual consent to labor union rules
merely from job retention.
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bers' labor markets. Individuals or other groups of employees, however, will wish to make competing demands and offers, and it is not
clear that a union could consistently command the power necessary to
require the employer to bargain exclusively with that union. The provisions of the NLRA, however, guarantee exclusivity to majority
unions and limit the right of other groups to bargain with or exercise
economic power against the employer. 45 Consequently, when the union
acts to impose terms of employment on all members of the bargaining
unit, including individuals who would not have supported the union,
it should be viewed as exercising power derived from the NLRA.
When this authority is exercised, particular attention should be paid
to restrictions that the Act explicitly or implicitly imposes on union
actions.
It is reasonable to conclude that Congress did not intend to authorize bargaining representatives to abridge freedom of communication
among their constituencies. A major purpose of the NLRA and subsequent labor legislation was to provide employees power to influence
their working conditions. If the legislation is to foster self-determination for employees, it must protect a free flow of information about the
beliefs and activities of the bargaining representative and of opposing
factions.4 6 Without such a flow of information, employee control over
45 Thus, for example, minorities may not negotiate separate bargaining agreements with
the employer. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Virginian R.R. v. System
Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). An individual who participates in a strike in defiance of
the designated bargaining representative is not protected by the NLRA against employer
reprisals. Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Draper Corp.,
145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
46 Cf. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rxv. 1049, 1074
(1951). It has been suggested that there are constitutional limitations on the union's ability
to restrict employees' freedom of speech. See, e.g., Note, 44 Neb. L. Rev. 645 (1965); cf.
Comment, Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government: A "State Action" Analysis,
supra note 41, at 8. Governmental action might be found in bargaining agent activities on
two grounds. See generally, Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083
(1960); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union and "Governmental Action," 70
YALE L.J. 345 (1961). First, state action is involved when Congress or a state legislature
affirmatively enables a party to act in a manner adversely affecting interests of a third
party. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401-02 (1950). A finding of state action, however,
would not necessarily lead to limitations on union power to waive employee solicitation
rights. It might be argued that because the right to solicit and distribute on employer
premises is generally treated as a statutory rather than a constitutional right, see, e.g.,
Central Hardware.Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), Congress could delegate to the bargaining representative authority to restrict this right. It is not dear, therefore, that a
finding of state action through affirmative grants of power preciudes a bargaining representative from waiving employee solicitation rights.
The second ground on which state action might be found is the existence of a strong
similarity or kinship between government and the labor organization. This similarity can
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representatives, and thus over working conditions, would be severely
restricted.
The existence of alternative channels for communication of such
47
information, emphasized by the Sixth Circuit in Armco, is irrelevant;
the same detriment to the employee that led to the general proscription of employer-imposed no-solicitation rules without regard to the
48
existence of alternative means of communication exists when contractual provisions are enforced.
In the absence of clear evidence that employee interests are served
by rules restricting communication, employees should retain their
right to distribute and solicit in the most appropriate forum, the place
of work.49 Actions of a bargaining representative that abridge this right
should be held a violation of the representative's duty of fair representation and coercive of the employees' section 7 rights and, thus, a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).5 0 Since the employer cannot rely on the
bargaining representative's acquiescence to justify an otherwise prohibited restriction, 51 any attempt by the employer to enforce such a
clause should be held a violation of section 8(a)(1).
II.

INTRA-UNION DISCIPLINE FOR ATTEMPTS TO
52
BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES

REmoVE

A union's power to restrict its members' activities, unlike its author-

ity to negotiate bargaining agreement provisions affecting all unit employees, is not based on authority granted by federal labor legislation.
be found in the underlying assumption of the NLRA that the unit employee, unlike
members of other organizations in our society, is not free to leave the unit and thus may
become, in effect, an involuntary subject of the "legislating" union. It might be argued
from this that an employee must be accorded a constitutional right to select those who
will govern him. Nevertheless, although the Board and the courts have deemed the right to
organize and select representatives a "fundamental" one under the Act, see UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 259 (1949); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937), it has never been accorded constitutional status.
344 F.2d 621, 625 (1965).
See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Republic Aluminum
NLRB, 394 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1968); cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
v.
Co.
U.S. 105, 112-13 (1956); General Aniline & Film Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1219, 55
L.R.R.M. 1126, 1127 (1964).
49 That is, in situations where there are not special circumstances justifying an employer's unilateral restrictions on the rights. See note 11 supra.
50 See note 32 supra.
51 See text and note at note 34 supra.
52 On problems posed by union discipline of its members, see generally Christensen,
Union Discipline Under FederalLaw: InstitutionalDilemmas in an Industrial Democracy,
43 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 227 (1968); Summers, supra note 46.
47

48
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Unions have historically been considered voluntary associations. 53 They
generally have been allowed to enforce even arbitrary conditions to
restrict membership 54 and to fine, suspend, or expel members by nondiscriminatory procedures provided in the union constitution or bylaws. 55 The NLRA leaves this situation unchanged in most respects.
Thus, although section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits the union from restraining
employees' exercise of their rights, the section's proviso states: "this
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein."56 The union's right to impose such discipline on
its members is considered a term of a contract between the union and
its members57 or among the members. 58 Union constitutions or by-laws
frequently provide that recalcitrant members may be fined, suspended,
or expelled for strikebreaking, dual unionism, or "conduct unbecoming a union member"-such as seeking to replace the union with
another bargaining representative. Union-imposed discipline is a powerful disincentive to union members' seeking to exercise their section 7
rights by decertifying or replacing the incumbent union.
Although the relevant sections of the NLRA and LMRDA make no
explicit distinctions between expulsion, suspension, and fines, 59 the
courts have held that a union may punish decertification and replacement efforts by suspending or expelling, but not by fining, the dissident member.6 0 These decisions seem correct insofar as they forbid
fines, but incorrect in allowing expulsion and overbroad in allowing
53 Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 381, 99 A. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct.
1916); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 A. 492, 494 (Ch.
1890). See generally, Summers, Right to join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. Rxv. 33 (1947). But
see Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Equal Employment Opportunities) § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(2)(c) (1970).
54 See, e.g., Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild, Local 280, 317 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 911 (1963); Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLR.B, 186 F.2d
1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 US. 815 (1951). See also cases collected in Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 1305, 1809-10 (1970).
55 See, e.g., American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782, 800 (7th Cir.
1951), af'd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, IAM, 279 F. Supp. 747, 755-56
(E.D. Mo. 1967); Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 713, 141 P.2d 486 (1943).
56 NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
57 See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182 (1967); IAM v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1958).
58 See, e.g., Elfer v. Marine Eng'rs Benefidal Ass'n No. 12, 179 La. 388, 392, 154 So. 32,
35 (1934); State ex rel. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 152, 28 N.W.2d 349, 353 (1947).
See generally Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HAiv. L. REv.
609, 613 (1959).
59 Cf. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970).
00 SVV text at notes 6,-92 infra.
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suspension for all decertification activities. A careful weighing of the
union and employee interests involved, in light of the justifications
offered by the courts for suspension and expulsion, suggests that the
only permissible response should be suspension from the time a decertification or election petition is filed until the end of the campaign.
A.

Fines
The Supreme Court has held that fines may be used to enforce a

union rule that is "properly adopted . . . [and] reflects a legitimate

union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free
to leave the union and escape the rule." 61 The Court has also held that
into the reasonableness of the
the Board is not authorized to0 inquire
2
fines.
amount of otherwise valid
The use of fines to restrain access of members to Board processes,
however, has been held an unfair labor practice. For example, in
CharlesS. Skura,63 the NLRB found that a union had violated section
8(b)(1)(A) by imposing a fine on a member who had filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union. The Board pointed out that
effective administration of the NLRA requires filing of unfair labor
practice charges by individuals because the General Counsel is unable
to initiate such an action. 4 The Board then stated: "Considering the
a rule.., by means of which a
overriding public interest involved ....
union seeks to prevent or limit access to the Board's processes is beyond
the lawful competency of a labor organization to enforce by coercive
means." 65 In NLRB v. International Molders and Allied Workers
01 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969); see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967). See also Lodge 405, 1AM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); NLRB v. Local

1029, Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1973).
In the case of a union shop, the Supreme Court has reserved decision on whether fines
may be enforced against members who have expressed their intention to be treated as
members of the union only for purposes of dues payment. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196-97 (1967). With reference to fines, the term "union members"
as used herein excludes "dues only" members.
62 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
03 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964). See also Laborers Union (Arnold Constr.
Co.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 82 L.R.R.M. 1257 (Jan. 16, 1973); Lathers' Union, Local 238,
156 N.L.R.B. 997, 61 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1966); H.B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674, 57 L.R.R.M.

1012 (1964), modified and enforced, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
64 148 N.L.R.B. at 681, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1011 (1964). This same factor was emphasized
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968), discussed in
text and notes at notes 76-80 infra.
65 148 N.L.R.B. at 682, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1010-11; cf. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(4) (1970).
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Local 125 (Blackhawk Tanning),6 6 the Seventh Circuit adopted the
same approach. Apparently untroubled by possible inconsistency with
its earlier approval of contractual waivers of employee solicitation
rights, including the circulation of decertification petitions,6 7 the court
enforced a Board finding that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A)
68
by fining a union member for circulating a decertification petition.
The court stressed that employees must have a right of access to the
69
Board's processes without impediments by private organizations.
When this right conflicts with union interests, "section 8(b)(1)(A) and
its proviso envision a balancing of the rights of the union against the
rights of employees and members on a case by case basis. ' ' 70 The court
then stated that a decertification petition, unlike an unfair labor practice charge, "attacks the very existence of the union as exclusive bargaining agent," 71 thus justifying defensive action by the union. Fines,
however, were not seen as serving these defensive purposes: "Once a
member pays the fine, he retains his membership and is able to attend
meetings and learn of union strategy .... [The fine's] only effect is to
punish a member who wishes to oust the union...."7
In Local 702, 1AM v. Loudermilk,73 the Fifth Circuit held that the
imposition of a fine on a union member for joining and supporting
another union infringed the free speech rights guaranteed him under
section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA.7 4 In reaching this conclusion the
court applied a balancing test, similar to that used in Blackhawk Tanning, to the proviso of section 101(a)(2) which states: "nothing herein
shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt
66 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971), enforcing 178 N.L.R.B. 208, 72 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1969).
67 See text and notes at notes 24-25 supra. The contractual waiver imposes a greater
limitation on the ability to replace the representative because it restricts both union and
nonunion members. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit's positions may be consistent if
concessions possibly received by the contracting union are emphasized.
68 The Board has also invoked the Blackhawk Tanning rule where a union member was
fined for soliciting authorization cards that a rival of the incumbent intended to use to
seek an election. Tri-Rivers Marine Eng'rs (U.S. Steel Corp.), 189 N.L.R.B. 838, 77 L.R.R.M.
1027 (1971).
69 442 F.2d at 94.
70 Id.
71 Id. The court's dicta approved the use of expulsion. Id.
72 Id. The Board relied upon this distinction in Tri-Rivers Marine Eng'rs (U.S. Steel

Corp.), 189 N.L.R.B. 838, 77 L.R.R.M. 1027 (1971).
73 444 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1971).
74 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970) provides in part: "Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express
any views, arguments, or opinions ...." The court noted that this section, added to the
LMRDA on the floor of Congress, lacked an "informative legislative history." 444 F.2d
at 721.
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and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution .... ,,5
In conclusion, the Board and the courts have found the imposition
of fines as punishment for support of a rival union or decertification
efforts to be a violation of the NLRA and the LMRDA because the infringement of employee rights caused by fines is not outweighed by any
legitimate union interest in imposing the fine.
B.

Expulsion

In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers76 the Supreme
Court restricted the right of unions to expel members for filing unfair
labor practice charges with the Board before exhausting internal union
remedies. The Court enforced the Board's order that the expelled
member be restored to membership, 77 emphasizing that "overriding
public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy
alternative, except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are
involved." 78 The Court explained: "[T]he proviso in Section 8(b)(1) (A)
that unions may design their own rules respecting 'the acquisition or
retention of membership' is not so broad as to give the union power to
penalize a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter
that is in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the
union."'7 9 In light of this prohibition of suspension and expulsion as
a means of penalizing union members for resorting to Board processes
and the Seventh Circuit's prohibition of fines as a means of punishing
union members who seek to oust the incumbent union, 80 it might be
expected that a union would have no right to expel or suspend a member for activities intended to secure the removal of the union as unit
bargaining representative. The Board and the courts, however, have refused to prohibit suspensions or expulsion for such activities.
75 LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) (1970).

76 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
77 The Board's decision is reported at 159 N.L.R.B. 1065, 62 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1966). See
Cannery Workers' Union (Van Camp Sea Food Co.), 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 62 L.R.R.M. 1298
(1966), reaching the same result.
78 391 U.S. at 424. The involvement of the employer in the action underlying the charge
in Marine Workers may have been a significant factor in the determination that internal
union procedures could not be relied on for a complete remedy. Id. at 425. See also
Laborer's Union (Arnold Constr. Co.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 82 L.R.R.M. 1257 (Jan. 16,
1973). Both Marine Workers and Skura involved conduct that might have violated both
sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3).
79 391 U.S. at 425. The Court also held that section 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970),
did not require that internal union procedures be exhausted. Id. at 426.
80 NLRB v. Molder's Local 125 (Blackhawk Tanning), 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971).
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1
In Tawas Tube Productssl
objections to a decertification election
were based on the expulsion of two employees from the union for
actively supporting a decertification movement. The Board pointed
out that "even a narrow reading of the [section 8(b)(1)(A)] proviso
would necessarily allow a union to expel members who attack the very
existence of the union as an institution,"8 2 and upheld the results of
the election. The Board concluded: "It would be difficult for the
Union to carry on an election campaign were [dissident members] entitled to 'equal rights and privileges .. to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings . . .' rights now guaranteed to union members
by Section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act." 83 The Board stated that a member's opposition to the
union reflects a lack of concern over continued membership in the
union. Skura was distinguished on the ground that the actions involved in that case were designed only to make the union abide by the
Act; the dissident member had not threatened the union's very
existence.8 4 Because the Board applies more stringent standards in determining whether an election was conducted under requisite laboratory conditions than it applies to the determination of whether conduct
violates section 8,85 the holding in Tawas Tube clearly indicates that
the Board would not consider such an expulsion a violation of section
8(b)(1) (A).
In Price v. NLRB 6 the Ninth Circuit, relying on Tawas Tube and
distinguishing Skura, upheld the Board's dismissal of an unfair labor
practice complaint based on 8(b)(1)(A), made by a member who had
been suspended from membership for filing a decertification petition,
The court stressed that the member's action had been "in a very real
sense an attack on the very existence of the union" 87 and held that the
union's action was protected by the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A).
The basis for treating fines differently from suspension or expulsion
may in part be found in the different weights accorded the forms of
discipline in the Blackhawk Tanning balancing test. 88 In that case the
Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the sanctions by finding that

81 151 N..R.B. 46,58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
82 Id. at 48, 8 L.R.R.M. at IS31.
83 Id.
84 Id.

85 See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962); General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948)
88 373 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1967), enforcing 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 60 L.1.R.M. 1008 (1965).
87 373 F.2d at 447.
88 See text at note 70 sUpra.
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fines were neither necessary nor effective in protecting the union as an
institution. 9 Suspension and expulsion---characterized by the Board in
Tawas Tube as "defensive" measures-were, however, seen as both
90
effective and appropriate. The Board in Tawas Tube and the Ninth
Circuit in Price9 ' had stressed this point, saying that in an election contest between the incumbent and the union favored by the dissident
member, the incumbent's status as bargaining representative would be
endangered were it forced to keep an insurgent in its midst. Suspension or expulsion, according to this view, effectively removes a member who might pose a substantial threat to the continued viability of
the union as bargaining representative.
A balancing is necessary between the interests of the union in meet92
ing its responsibilities and preserving its institutional status and the
interests of the member in continued membership. In setting up the
interests to be balanced, however, the Board and the courts have failed
to set forth accurately the interests of the employee in retaining membership, the differing union interests in the contexts of the circulation of
a decertification petition and an election campaign, and the different
effects of expulsion and suspension on the employee and the union.
It has frequently been asserted that an employee's opposition to the
incumbent union indicates that he has no significant interest in retaining union membership; 93 this is simply incorrect. First, although expulsion or suspension for opposition to the union should have no direct
89 Fines, like suspension or expulsion, have been found to be inherently coercive within
the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A). See NLRB v. Molder's Local 125, 442 F.2d 92, 94 (7th
Cir. 1971). Since they are coercive, it is clear that they have some effect in protecting the

union against active opposition. Thus, the distinction between fines and suspension or
expulsion drawn in Blackhawk Tanning and other cases implies that deterrence per se is
not a "legitimate" union interest. A valid defensive measure is evidently one that protects
the union by preventing disruption of its processes or frustration of its efforts to communicate with unit employees, not merely one that protects its position.
90 151 N.L.R.B. 46,48,58 L.R.R.M. 1830, 1831 (1965).
91 373 F.2d 448, 447 (9th Cir. 1967). See discussion in text at notes 86-87 supra.
92 Protection of institutional status is probably a necessary element in this balance
because of the provisos to sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 101(a)(2). The Supreme Court has pointed

out that section 8(b)(1)(A), even without considering its proviso, "was not meant to
regulate the internal affairs of unions." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 888 U.S. 175,
186 (1967). Certainly, its proviso prevents any inference that restrictions on the union's
application of "reasonable" conditions of membership was intended, In interpreting this
proviso, words subsequently used by Congress in passing the related proviso to LMRDA
§ 101(a)(2) are relevant. For example, the similarity of the balancing tests in Blackhawk
Tanning,see text at note 70 supra, and IAM v. Loudermilk, see text at notes 73-75 supra,
indicates that these provisions are read in pan materia. Cf. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 194 (1967); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 US. 274, 291-92 (1960).
93 See, e.g., Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 49, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330, 1331 (1965).
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effect on the employee's job,94 practice may not match theory; even
where the employer intends to obey the dictates of section 8(a)(3), the
employee may not be aware of those protections. In addition, the dissident may have other economic interests in retaining membership,
such as union strike benefits or pension plan coverage. 5 The employee
participating in decertification or replacement activities also may recognize the possibility of and wish protection against a failure of this particular means of control of his leadership. He may, therefore, desire to
retain a voice in "internal" union decisions that will profoundly affect
his interests.9 6 Expulsion or suspension deprives him of the opportunity
to participate in this form of control over his working environment.7
The basic ground for approving suspension and expulsion has been
that they are "valid defensive measures" because they prevent the
member from either disrupting meetings or disclosing strategy.98 The
union's need for these defenses, however, is questionable. Section
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA 99 expressly protects the right of a union to
control disruption of meetings regardless of the reason for the disruption. It is doubtful that meetings of a union seeking to protect its incumbency involve discussion of strategy that must be kept secret from
rivals. Deterring opposition is not a valid union interest because it
conflicts with NLRA policies of self-determination. 100 Moreover, although the union may feel threatened by a solicitation of opposition
whenever it occurs, it is only when support is strong and an election
imminent that the threat is serious. Solicitation of opposition is a
necessary aspect of pre-election campaigning, but often its only effect is
to test support for a dissident faction and alert union leadership to a
need for a change in their policies. The powerful defensive tool of barring a member from union activities should not be allowed unless an
election is potentially imminent. Specifically, use of the tool should be
allowed only within a limited time, for example sixty days, before the
date when a petition for decertification or replacement may be filed. 10 1
94 See NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
95 Cf. Cannery Workers' Union (Van Camp Sea Food Co.), 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 846, 62
L.R.R.M. 1298, 1299 (1966); Mitchell v. 1AM, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 799, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813,
815 (1961); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921).
96 These decisions may include selection of officers to represent the unit, strike votes, and
approval of contracts.
97 Cf. Summers, supra note 46, at 1056-58.
98 See, e.g., Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1967); Tawas Tube Prods., Inc.,
151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330, 1331 (1965). On the role of deterrence, see note
89 supra.
99 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
100 See text and notes at notes 11-12 and note 89 supra.
101 The date on which barring a member becomes justified must be prior to the filing
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More important, expulsion, as opposed to temporary suspension,
cannot be regarded as a necessary defensive measure even during this
period. Assuming that possible disclosure of incumbent election
strategy by dissident members weakens the incumbent's ability to protect itself, the dangers of disclosure continue only until the election is
held. Similarly, the problem of disruption of meetings (insofar as
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA does not offer a solution) relates to dissident
tactics primarily used during the petition and campaign periods. It is
not clear that a supporter of a rival union will necessarily be capable
of, or interested in, sabotaging incumbent operations when replacement or decertification is not available.
Most of the time, elections are not imminent and, indeed, not permitted. The NLRA prohibits new elections within a year of preceding
elections. 10 2 Board policy imposes longer restrictions when valid col1
lective bargaining agreements exist.

3

Moreover, election campaigns

take time and energy. An individual who opposed the union in an unsuccessful election drive may realize the futility of his position, and
reconcile himself to working for his objectives through intra-union
channels.
The legitimate interests that the union seeks to protect by suspension or expulsion could adequately be protected by denying an insurgent the right to participate in union activities until after the election
is held.1°4 Pension and other economic rights of the suspended member could be frozen at pre-suspension levels until his automatic reinstatement, and dues payments would be suspended. 10 5 This sanction
would allow the union to protect its right to conduct its business with
of a petition because extensive campaigning must be conducted before this time. See note
4 supra. Petitions may be filed during a thirty day period beginning ninety days before
the termination of an existing contract (of up to three years) and ending sixty days before
the termination date. Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 41 L.R.R.M. 1901
(1962). When the contract bar is inapplicable, petitions may be filed at any time after sixty
days preceding the first anniversary date of the last election. Randolph Metal Works, Inc.,
147 N.L.R.B. 973, 56 L.R.R.M. 1348 (1964).
102

NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).

103 In practice, the bar will frequently extend for three years from the time of execution of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123,
51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962).
104 Although relatively little campaigning is likely to take place after the election is
conducted, rancor and hostility toward dissidents may be quite strong for a period following the election. Potential violence and general disruption of union activities, when
balanced against the limited value the employee would realize from readmission to a
hostile union, might justify permitting the suspension to continue for a limited period

following the election.
105 Cf. Steelworkers Local 4186 (McGraw Edison Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. 992, 73 L.R.R.M.

1570 (1970).
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minimal harassment, but would not subject the employee to the excessive penalties of expulsion. 10 Limiting permissible union reaction to
suspension would thus achieve the proper balance of union and em107
ployee interests.
CONCLUSION

A central policy of the NLRA is the promotion of employees' right
to choose their bargaining representative. The power to decertify or
replace their bargaining representative is necessary for adequate exercise of that right. Accordingly, incumbent unions should not be allowed
to curtail employee solicitation and distribution activities by agreeing to contractually imposed no-solicitation rules that would be invalid
if imposed by the employer unilaterally. Similarly, incumbent unions
should not be allowed to fine or expel members who have solicited
opposition. The valid union interest in preserving its integrity so that
it may continue to function as a bargaining representative is adequately protected if it is allowed to suspend, prior to a possible election, those dissident members who seek decertification or replacement.
John Anthony Strain
106 The protection thus afforded the employee is obviously not absolute. The union
may still expel him for certain antiunion activities other than decertification and replacement efforts. For example, he might be expelled for attempting to hinder union
performance of legal or contractual obligations, supporting the employer in a manner
injurious to the union's effectiveness, or refusing to comply with valid union work rules
or work stoppage decisions.
107 Cf. Note, 8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 432 (1970).

